Sixty years ago the German refugee scholar and lawyer Max Hirschberg, in his study of wrongful convictions, rightly observed, "Innocent men wrongfully convicted are countless.

-- Max Hirschberg, "Convicting the Innocent."

CONVICTIONS OF THE INNOCENT
by
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"I'm innocent ... really! Almost cliched, it's a running joke — in and out of prison. Everyone in prison is innocent, let them tell it. Yet, a surprising number of studies reveal that many are, indeed, really innocent. In the unrelenting clamor for revenge against prisoners, it's this particularly vulnerable group which falls forgotten to America's war on crime: the wrongfully convicted.

Untold billions flow into the black hole of prison expansion, while funds to represent indigent citizens are drastically diminished. This translates into less case investigation, less resources for trial preparation and inadequate defenses that amount to nothing more than a shorter rail line toward conviction, particularly for the indigent innocent. Being convicted of a crime one is innocent of is a living nightmare.
In whatever way the nightmare unrolls, it is a nightmare in which the silent screams of the innocent reverberate throughout the country. If you listen carefully, the injustice could chime as close as your nearest courthouse.

If asked, some people might be hard pressed to define justice, but the following stories give a startling description of injustice and its grim reality as it wades its way through the country we so unreservedly call "the land of freedom."

For instance, in the disquieting case of Herrera v. Collins, Leonel Herrera, a Texas death row prisoner appealed his conviction to the U.S. Supreme Court on the grounds of newly discovered evidence that he believed proved his innocence. In his denial statement, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the execution of an innocent person wouldn't necessarily violate the U.S. Constitution.

A more surprising element in the matrix of wrongful convictions are false confessions. Indeed, why would anyone make a false confession? In 2011, Helena, Montana, resident Berry Beach was released from prison after 28 continuous years for the 1979 murder of his high school classmate, Kim Nees, a murder he confessed to, but did not commit. Steven Drizin, a criminal law professor at Northwestern University School of Law and the director of the Center on Wrongful Convictions studied more than 250 cases of proven wrongful convictions. He describes for USA Today newspaper how some murder investigators prematurely presume the guilt of a suspect and in their zeal to prove their own hunch, they will zealously pursue a confession (Adams, 2011). Still, why would anyone confess to a crime they
are innocent of? Drizin describes an eerie-sounding practice wherein investigators begin to make direct or implied threats; threats of long sentences, and promises for leniency.

Promises of leniency are what turned an innocent 14-year-old Chicagoan named Terrell Scott. After 12 hours of intimidation by burly white officers standing over him, and lurching in his face, along with being (illegally) refused an attorney, and being deprived of his right to call home, Scott readily confessed. These practices became so routine in Chicago that the Windy City was dubbed "The False Confession Capitol of the U.S." Chi-town has twice the number of false confessions as the U.S. federal system (60 Minutes, December 2012).

Like Scott, the vast majority of false confessions are made by young black men. Scott was arrested at age 14, he was promised that he could go home to his mom if he simply confessed. When he complied, he didn't go home that night as promised. In fact, Scott didn't go home until he was 34-years-old. As has been shown in many cases, investigators supplied Scott the specific details of the case to aid the so-called validity of confession. Thank goodness for checks and balances; the courts have overturned 85 of Chicago's confession cases since 1989, in large part due to investigations by the New York-based Innocence Project. In some of the more flagrant cases prosecutors ignored exculpatory evidence, including concrete DNA evidence. Disquieting to say the least (60 Minutes, December 2012, Ibid.).

According to University of Virginia law professor Brandon Garrett, author of the 2011 book, Convicting the Innocent, of the 250 cases he
reviewed, 40 of the confessions contained details for crimes they did not commit (Adams, 2011). Not one of the confessions were sufficiently recorded for outside scrutiny. Beach was sentenced to 100 years in prison. Scott was sentenced to 15 years to life. The U.S. Supreme Court estimates that 94 to 97 percent of criminal cases end in plea deals, where people must at least partially admit guilt (Missouri v. Frye, 2012; see also Lafler v. Cooper, 2012; and Prison Legal News, September 2012). In a criminal justice system that relies so heavily on admissions of guilt, any undue influence by authorities is cause for concern.

These are extreme sentences, particularly for an innocent person. Now imagine a wrongful death conviction. As of 1998, the latest data accessible to these writers, there have been 75 known cases of people wrongfully sentenced to die in America (McCormick, 1998).

Chicago's death row is where Dennis Williams and Verneal Jemerson sat for 18 years. They were convicted (along with two others) for the heinous abduction and bloody murder of a young and loving couple. DNA finally cleared the two black men. Yet allegations of racial discrimination -- among police, prosecutors and jurors -- continue to muddy what residual of trust blacks have of Chicago's justice system.

In fact, with blacks disproportionately subject to arrest in America (1 in every 4 in the U.S.), closely followed by Latinos, minorities have long felt that they are the cash-cow of corrections, a misnomer for the U.S. prison system. The 1980 case of Clarence Bradley, a black American, accused of killing Cheryl Dee Fergusson, a blonde-haired, hazel-eyed Texas student, only serves to add credence to this belief. A white officer
allegedly told Bradley and a white janitor that one of them would hang for the murder. The white officer then turned to Bradley and said plainly: "Since you're the nigger, you're elected." After a long and dark ten-year struggle, it was proven that prosecutors suppressed exculpatory evidence against Bradley and he was eventually freed (McCormick, 1998, Ibid; see also Radelet, Bedau and Putman, 1992).

In California, a false confession and racial prejudice converged to make for one of the Big Bear's most recent egregious cases of injustice. Brian Banks had aspirations of becoming a professional football player. With growing interest from the National Football League, his aspirations were a real possibility. The 6-foot-4, 225 pound, chocolate-skinned 16-year-old had big dreams. But those dreams were quickly dashed when he was falsely accused of rape, and facing a sentence of 41 years to life. With little or no investigation, his public defender advised Banks to plead guilty because a jury (of his so-called peers) would likely convict him because of his size and the color of his skin.

He was given just ten minutes to make a decision that would affect the rest of his life. All too familiar with the most likely outcome for black Americans in U.S. jury trials, Banks, despite his innocence, couldn't muster the faith needed to proceed with trial. He pleaded guilty for a lesser sentence. After being cleared later, when the victim came forward to admit she lied, the case went national. (KCRW Radio, June 1, 2012; see also Powers, 2012). In May of 2012, the Northwestern University joined the University of Michigan to conduct a study on wrongful convictions. Of the 900 men studied, half were black, and the vast majority of their
convictions were due to faulty eyewitness identifications, particularly in sexual assault cases (KCRW Radio News, May 21, 2012).

The fact that eyewitness testimony cannot always be trusted was drawn to public attention earlier in this century by Harvard's professor of experimental psychology, Hugo Musterberg, who staged a "shooting" in his classroom to prove to skeptical students that witnesses to the same event do not tell the same story (Radelet, Bedau and Putman, 1992).

Leslie Stahl, the gray-haired anchor for the news magazine 60 Minutes was shown various "tricks" used by law enforcement in eyewitness cases and a slew of common mistakes were revealed as to how flagrant errors are made by earnest victims in police lineups. When Stahl pointed out the face of the man who she had seen moments before in a video, she was certain she had identified the right person. However, the only thing that was certain was that she had picked the wrong person (60 Minutes, July 19, 2009). As simple as that, a life can be destroyed. These are facts we must live with in a fallible world. The only remedy to reduce mistakes in such an error-prone environment is to proceed with caution; scrutinizing the evidence, asking hard questions and making sure that in the task of our civic duty, guesswork, conjecture and above all, prejudice is absent, particularly among those that show such inclinations in a jury panel.

Oregon recently lent us hope by being the very first state in the nation to require specific guidelines for trials involving eyewitness identification. After reviewing the latest science, past errors, police and prosecutorial misconduct, new standards were ordered. Oregon admissibility guidelines now require that police lineups be conducted by someone who is
blind to the identity of the true suspect; others in the lineup must resemble the physical description given by the witnesses and photos of potential suspects must be shown one at a time, not in groups. Police and prosecutors must also declare the circumstances for which they obtain any witness descriptions or identifications. For instance, in the Oregon case that spawned these new guidelines, the witness had been heavily medicated by doctors prior to police suggesting who they believed the perpetrator was (Murphy, 2012).

Another path to wrongful convictions are mistaken or charlatan expert witnesses. Such was the case with 28-year-old Glen Dale Woodall, a West Virginia cemetery worker. Woodall was accused, convicted and imprisoned for the brutal kidnapping and rape of not one, but two women. He was sentenced to two life sentences, and, an additional 325 years to cement an already sealed fate of death behind bars.

The linchpin in Woodall's conviction wasn't hard evidence, such as clothing from one of the victims, or possession of property that belonged to one of the victims, nor even an eye witness. It was the state's medical examiner who testified, based on his personal experience, that Woodall's semen matched that of the specimen found on both victims. Expert witnesses are often afforded nearly unquestioned credibility in court hearings by juries. They are believed to be totally impartial, infallible and on the exclusive side of science, nothing more. But as renowned defense attorney Thomas Mesereau Jr. was quoted in his 2007 defense of music producer Phil Spector, the prosecutor's office "has the sheriff's department; the crime lab; the coroner's office. Their forensics experts [are all] paid for by
the taxpayer." They are by nature of the business hired guns — who want to continue to be hired, again and again. And to express balance to what are often infinite resources by the state, Mesereau Jr. stated: "The prosecutor is used to bowling over a poor defendant... When they occasionally run into a wealthy defendant ... what [the wealthy defendant buys] is fairness" (Deutsch, 2007; see also Antelope Valley Press, 2007).

The expert testimony of medical examiner Fred Zain not only locked Woodall away for life, but that of hundreds of other rape and murder defendants for the state of Virginia, and later Texas. The problem was that Zain was flat out wrong — in the majority of his "expert" opinions. After nearly five years of incarceration, Woodall's attorney took a shot in the dark and had a DNA test of Woodall's semen compared to the specimen held in evidence. Woodall's innocence was conclusive.

The West Virginia Supreme Court later ordered an examination of Zain's expert testimony in some 4,500 other criminal cases in two states. The result was that Zain's testimony was systematically and scientifically deficient. The Court made the following ruling: "Any testimony or documentary evidence offered by Zain, at any time, in any criminal prosecution, should be deemed invalid, unreliable and inadmissible." (Abu-Jamal, 1995). According to a 2003 U.S. Justice Department report, some 3,000 criminal cases were thought to be affected by flawed science and skewed expert testimony. During that time approximately 13 lab technicians across the country had made significant scientific errors that tainted criminal prosecutions.

Following the May 2012 study of wrongful convictions jointly
conducted by Northwestern University and the University of Michigan, their research concluded that an unacceptable number of convictions are being caused by police and prosecutorial misconduct — or what the average person might call lying and cheating (KCRW Radio News, May 21, 2012, Ibid.).

The annals of wrongful convictions are replete with cases of prosecutorial misconduct. In 2010 research conducted by the Northern California Innocence Project at the Santa Clara University School of Law (a Veritas Initiative), revealed a litany of preventable errors in the court arena. This comprehensive study of judicial findings detailed more than 700 cases of prosecutorial misconduct that resulted in the innocent being wrongfully convicted and some otherwise solid cases being compromised and thrown out.

A summary of their findings revealed:

> In 102 cases, courts found that prosecutors committed misconduct. Courts found 130 instances of misconduct in those 102 cases.

> In 26 of the cases, the findings resulted in the setting aside of the conviction or sentence, mistrial or barring of evidence.

> In 76 cases, the courts nevertheless upheld the convictions, ruling that misconduct did not alter the fundamental fairness of the trial, yet misconduct did occur (Northern California Innocence Project, 2010).

> In 31 other cases, the courts refrained from making rulings on the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, instead holding that any error would not have undermined the fairness of the trial or that the issue was waived. Still, misconduct was present.

This is a summary, in pertinent part, of the findings from 1997 through
2010:

> In more than 800 cases, courts found that prosecutors committed misconduct.

> In 202 cases, the finding resulted in setting aside the conviction or sentence, mistrial or of evidence.

In more than 800 cases of misconduct, 107 prosecutors were found to have committed misconduct more than once, two were cited for misconduct four times, two were cited five times and one prosecutor was cited for misconduct six times. Prosecutors who committed misconduct in multiple cases accounted for nearly one-third of all cases of misconduct (Northern California Innocence Project, 2010, Ibid.)

Misconduct in these cases included failure to turn over favorable evidence to the defense, presenting false evidence, engaging in improper examinations, making false and prejudicial arguments, violating defendants' Fifth Amendment right to silence, and discriminating against minorities in jury selection. In all, there were 34 findings of misconduct in these cases, including six findings that prosecutors failed to turn over favorable evidence to the defense. In some cases, the rulings came in the midst of trials and in others, the rulings came years after conviction.

An estimated 700 to 1,000 drug prosecutions were also dismissed or dropped because prosecutors in the San Francisco District Attorney's Office failed to disclose damaging information about a police drug lab technician. In May 2010, Superior Court Judge Anne Christine Massullo found that prosecutors violated the constitutional rights of a vast number of defendants by failing to disclose to defense attorneys the problems
relating to the cocaine-skimming drug technician. The judge found that a memo written by deputy district attorney Sharon Woo, expressing concern that the lab technician was an unreliable witness, proved that prosecutors "at the highest levels of the District Attorney's Office" were well aware of the situation, but this crucial information was never forwarded to the defense attorneys involved in these cases that relied on the technician's work.

The pattern of corruption and lack of integrity continued in the federal prosecutions brought against executives of California-based Broadcom Corporation. In 2009, U.S. District Court Judge Cormac Carney dismissed charges against Broadcom former chief financial officer William Ruehle and company co-founder Henry T. Nichols III on the grounds that the prosecutor, Andrew Stolper, intimidated witnesses. The charges included drug trafficking, possession of large amounts of illegal substances, along with a number of illegalities related to their enterprise. In 2010, Carney dismissed additional charges against Nichols (Pfeifer, 2010; see also Ridolfu and Possley, 1997-2009; and Northern California Innocence Project, 2010, Ibid.).

The California Innocence Project at the Santa Clara University School of Law study also described actual cases, such as that of Bobby Maxwell. In November 2010, more than a quarter century after Maxwell, also known as the "Skidrow Stabber," was convicted and sentenced to life in prison, the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals ordered prosecutors to release him or give him a new trial. The reason cited was due to appalling prosecutorial misconduct. In the decision (Maxwell v. Roe, 2010), authored by appeals
court jurist Richard Paez, the court found that the prosecution had failed to turn over impeachment evidence to Maxwell's lawyers and failed to correct false testimony from its star witness, infamous jailhouse informant Sidney Storch. "The prosecutor's failure to disclose this impeachment evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of Maxwell's trial..." Judge Paez wrote (Maxwell, 2010, Ibid.).

The prosecutor's failure to correct Storch's testimony ... was prejudicial," the judge said (Maxwell, 2010, Ibid.). The prosecutor assigned to the case was then-Los Angeles deputy district attorney Sterling Norris. The appeals court complained that Norris failed to disclose evidence of benefits given to Storch and when Storch lied about them, Norris failed to correct his false testimony. The finding was the second case in which Norris has been cited for misconduct. The decision ordering a new trial or for Maxwell's release is among 26 court rulings in 2010 identified by Veritas Initiative where prosecutorial misconduct was deemed harmful -- that is, the conduct undermined the integrity of the convictions, caused mistrials or evidence to be barred (and cost taxpayers millions in court and custodial expenses).

Maxwell was arrested in 1979 and charged with the murders of 10 men in downtown Los Angeles. After a nine-month trial, Maxwell was convicted of two counts of murder and one count of robbery, largely stemming from the testimony of Storch, who claimed Maxwell confessed to him in a jail cell. The only physical evidence against Maxwell was a palm print found on a public bench near the body of one of the victims; a public bench that thousands of other Los Angeles residents had also touched.
"Here, the prosecution itself admitted that the evidence against Maxwell was weak, that Maxwell had consistently maintained his innocence, and that the police testimony about the date of the palm print was speculative, Judge Paez concluded (Maxwell, 2010, Ibid.). "The prosecution failed, however, to disclose multiple pieces of impeachment information that could have been used to undermine the credibility of Storch," the judge opined (Maxwell, 2010, Ibid.). In 2004, the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals also set aside the murder conviction and life sentence of Timothy Gantt, also due to Norris' failure to turn over evidence to the defense (Gantt v. Roe, 2004).

The wide-spread problem of police misconduct, to the extent of absolute corruption, could not be better exemplified than that of the Los Angeles Police Department Rampart Scandal. Think fictional tales such as Training Day, on octane, Lakeview Terrace, on steroids, or CRASH, on rocket fuel.

The story of scandal had been years in the making before it all unraveled in 1999, when elite officer Rafael Perez, who had been "sponsored" to enter the CRASH unit (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums). Sponsorship by a respected member of the CRASH team was required before an outsider could enter into the intricacies of the exclusive network. Sammy Martin, a close friend of Officer David Mack, vouched for Officer Perez. Among the more notable crimes ascribed to the unit were robbing suspects and citizens, and at least one bank robbery (by Officer Mack), collaborating with street gangs in criminal activity and some officers, such as Mack, were literally gang members themselves. Yet, most
relevant to this writing is their crimes of framing suspects.

Members of the unit routinely planted drugs on suspects, enemies and citizens, they shot unarmed suspects and planted what they called "drop guns" on them. Adding to their long list of crimes, they conspired to falsify reports to protect the criminal unit. While citizens, suspects and defendants had been complaining about the unit's illegalities for years, it wasn't until repeated thefts from the L.A.P.D. evidence locker, including 9 pounds of powdered cocaine, went missing that Officer Perez came under suspicion (Reavill and Brown, 2000). The investigation peeled one criminal act after another, by the layers, involving other officers, including a sergeant. When officer Perez was finally arrested and agreed to "sing like a bird" on his cohorts, investigators were astounded by a song that lasted nearly 14 hours before they wearily concluded the session for the night (Boyer, 2001).

The *Los Angeles Times* called it "the worst corruption scandal in L.A.P.D. history." Indeed, it was worse than Rodney King in 1991, it was worse than a history of racial profiling and repeated accusations of racism since its 1920s chief, Louis Oaks, who was a verified member of the Klu Klu Klan. Now, under the leadership of a black man, Bernard Parks, the department was experiencing another dark era (Boyer, 2001 Ibid).

The most heart-wrenching event of evidence planting was the case of 19-year-old Javier Francisco Ovando. In 1996 Officers Perez and his partner, Nino Durden were on stakeout. Ovando had walked up and accidentally surprised the officers, who responded with a hail of bullets. Ovando was critically struck in the head and chest before they realized he
was unarmed. As Ovando lay bleeding out, Officer Durden, according to Officer Perez, placed a drop gun near Ovando. Their cover story was that Ovando was a vicious, gang-banging cop killer who had burst in on their post with the intent to assassinate them. Ovando, a Honduran who speaks very broken English, survived the encounter, but was paralyzed as a result and confined to a wheelchair. During trial for attempted murder of the officers, among other charges, he was convicted after Officer Perez convincingly testified against him. The judge threw the book at Ovando for the blatantly irreverent crime and for his apparent lack of remorse.

Upon the revelation that it was the officers who were in the wrong, it was the police department heads, not the District Attorney's Office or a defense attorney, who sought Ovando's immediate release. According to Officer Perez, Ovando was just one of many such victims. A Blue Ribbon Rampart Review Panel was created in 2003 to investigate what went wrong. Among numerous criticisms, the panel found that there existed a long-time lack of sufficient checks to prevent officers from lying or fabricating evidence (Antelope Valley Press, July 13, 2006).

As the lawsuits go forward, it is estimated the city will be forced to pay hundreds of millions for its officers' criminal activities. Over 100 criminal cases have been overturned thus far, and an estimated 4,000 more cases may still be affected. In 2002, in an extraordinary measure to regain public trust in the justice system, following the Rampart scandal, Governor Gray Davis signed into law Senate Bill 1391. This bill gives prisoners sentenced to life without the possibility of parole and death the right to seek all discovery materials that a defendant would have been entitled to
was Produka's killer; that he confessed he committed the crime. A physical
description given by Produka's younger brother fit Gregory Cudjo. During
trial, over a year later, while Armenia Cudjo waited in the county jail,
John Culver, a neighbor, told the sheriff, the trial lawyers, and anyone
who would listen, that while Gregory Cudjo was being detained in jail for
questioning, Gregory Cudjo had confessed that he had killed Produka. At
trial the judge refused to allow Culver to testify. The question in such
cases is why? Why deprive a jury of any of the facts? Yet, decisions like
this are common in courts all across the nation.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Armenia Cudjo was denied
the right to present a defense. When given the opportunity in 2008, Gregory
Cudjo confessed to the killing and confirmed that he had previously
admitted to killing Produka. After 12 years on death row, Armenia Cudjo was
finally vindicated (Egelko, 2012).

Not so fortunate was California prisoner Omer Gallion. Gallion was
assigned to the docket of U.S. District Court Judge Percy Anderson, in the
Central District of the Golden State. Judge Anderson has a history of
allowing potentially meritorious petitions to grow stale — for years.
Gallion filed a habeas petition claiming he had been wrongfully convicted.
A magistrate judge recommended that Gallion's petition be granted. However,
Gallion died in prison six years later, in 2010, while awaiting for Judge
Anderson to act. In July 2011, the Daily Journal, a legal publication,
reported that Judge Anderson had sat on habeas petitions for periods
ranging from 5½ to 8 years after magistrate judges had recommended relief
While defense attorneys can hardly force a judge to be fair, it is when defense attorneys themselves drop the ball that the situation is exacerbated for the defendant. The American mainstream press has repeatedly reported on stories of defense attorneys sleeping in court, appearing in court inebriated or even high, but it doesn't end there. Ponder on the death penalty case of Cory Maples: The Alabama death row prisoner lost his right to appeal after the law firm representing him misplaced his court motion somewhere in their own mailroom.

As a result, Maples, who was convicted in 1997 of a double murder, was barred from appealing his conviction. And while Maples maintains his innocence, at least in part, the courts did not want to hear it; he was late and lacked diligence in the pursuit of proving his case, the courts repeatedly opined. However, it wasn't Maples' neglect, but that of his attorneys. Still, as representatives of the client, anything that the counsel does is owned by the client, even if he is locked up thousands of miles from his attorneys and has no control — whatsoever — over what the attorneys do; the attorney and client, as the court proceedings go, are one in the same.

Yet, in a rare exhibition of compassion (and fairness), the court gave Maples a break. Writing for the majority, in a 7-2 decision, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg said, "No just system would allow a missed deadline to be held against the inmate .... Maples was disarmed by extraordinary circumstances quite beyond his control." He was convicted of murdering two of his companions after a night of drinking, yet, as Ginsberg noted, "His inexperienced and underfunded attorneys failed to develop and raise an
obvious intoxication defense, did not object to several egregious instances of prosecutorial misconduct and woefully unprepared for the penalty phase of his trial."

Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented and complained, among other issues, that such a ruling would open the flood gates to other prisoners, who, perhaps, were neglected or abandoned by their counsel. The ruling was limited to Maples (Liptak, 2012; see also Maples v. Thomas, 2012).

It is here where the variance between having an overwhelmed and underfunded public defender or well paid and enthusiastic court advocate can make the difference between life and death, or freedom and life imprisonment.

There are many critical stages in any criminal case. Perhaps one of the most critical is when there is a jailhouse informant, otherwise known as a snitch. The case of Maxwell, above, offered a glimpse of the problems with snitches. They almost always have an ulterior, personal motive; they are highly unreliable and all too often, the terms for which they are testifying, i.e., whether they are receiving unknown, untold promises is hardly ever fully revealed. The details of these and other problems were enumerated in yet another epic scandal involving the Los Angeles criminal justice system.

The Report of the 1989-1990 Los Angeles County Grand Jury, titled: "Investigation of the Involvement of Jailhouse Informants in the Criminal Justice System in Los Angeles County (IIJI), began: "On or about October 24, 1988, a jailed informant demonstrated for the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department how he and others could obtain confidential information and then fabricate confessions of fellow prisoners (IIJI, Ibid.). Thousands of pages of documents and other evidence were reviewed by the Grand Jury, over 120 witnesses testified before the Grand Jury and 147 exhibits were introduced into evidence. Witnesses included several other jailhouse informants, judges, district attorneys and prosecutorial staff, county and state public defenders and members of the bar, police and Sheriff's department, custodial employees and private citizens (IIJI, Ibid.).

As in prosecutorial and police misconduct cases, the extent of the cases adversely affected may never be known. What is known is that a small army of jailhouse informants played the system, and the taxpayers of Los Angeles County. Various jailhouse informants, in and out of custody, testified to their own schemes and malfeasance. The jailhouse informants central to the Grand Jury investigation had been charged with a number of crimes ranging from armed robbery, to rape and even murder, and every crime in between. Nearly every informant had an inclination toward recidivism. One informant was convicted of two counts of arson in 1975, convicted in 1979 for attempted rape in 1981 (or 1982), rearrested in 1985 and thereafter convicted of multiple counts of rape, kidnap, robbery and other sexual offenses (IIJI, Ibid.)

Whatever the individual motive of the jailhouse informant, courts have long recognized "the potential for untrustworthiness which is inherent in such testimony because of the strong inducements to lie or shape testimony in favor of the prosecution" (IIJI, Ibid.). Rarest is a jailhouse
informant's willingness to testify based on his moral leanings, repugnance of a particular crime or the defendant's lack of remorse (IIJI, Ibid.). Jailhouse informants expect some reward for their testimony, and in some cases they demand it (IIJI, Ibid.)

The benefits can range from extra servings of food to lighter sentences. For example, for past cooperation, an officer arranged for an informant's transfer to a cell with a TV, coffee pot and other amenities not available to other inmates. Another informant asked and was granted a request that his incarcerated girlfriend with a million dollar bail be released on her own recognizance. And yet another informant who testified for the prosecution had his assault charges on a police officer dropped; allowed to plead guilty to the remaining robbery charges and received a shortened sentence of three years. And still another informant testified that he received several thousand dollars and housing expenses once released from custody; for at least eight months he received free rent valued at $525 a month and $200 a month in other living expenses (IIJI, Ibid.). (This is common according to writer Williams' research.)

Many informants testify repeatedly for favors; one informant claims that he testified for the prosecution in Los Angeles County 10 times. The methods used to manipulate fellow inmates and professionals alike is both astounding and frightening. Several informants claim that they collaborate with each other to deceive vulnerable inmates, exploit the system and manipulate law enforcement. An appalling number of instances of perjury or other falsifications to law enforcement during the past ten years were described by informants (IIJI, Ibid.).
Informants also described their knowledge and familiarity with the system and people in the district attorney's office. One informant said he would call prosecutors he knew and tell them the case numbers and names of defendants the prosecutor was pursuing. He would then seek leniency by offering information. One informant said he would call the coroner's office, or other city departments, pose as a prosecutor and ask particulars to learn the details necessary for personal leverage. Several testified they obtained copies of police reports, case files and photographs of defendants and victims to use for their advantage (IIJI, Ibid.).

Other informants claimed they were approached by police and sheriff's deputies and asked to "cell-up" with certain individuals in order to strike up trust and conversations that would enhance the government's case against other inmates. More informants claimed that police asked them how to burglarize a home or how the drug dealing game works; they gave them what they wanted and became part of the official informant network. Others were forced in by constant announcements directed at the inmate over the public address system in the jail in order to make it appear that the inmate was an informant. Once labeled by the jail population as a "snitch," his safety became an issue and he had to seek custodial protection. Some informants claim they were simply placed in the cell of a defendant for a few days without being asked to do anything. Once a record is created that the informant and defendant shared a cell for a period of time, the police would simply provide the informant with critical details of the case to later be used by the informant in court (IIJI, Ibid.).

In one case, an informant offered to testify for the district
attorney. The district attorney found the informant's testimony lacking in credibility and so the informant offered to testify for the defense, who also declined (ILJI, Ibid.).

In 1984 Federico M. Macias was sentenced to death in Texas. He was vindicated in 1993 when a former cell mate admitted in federal court he had perjured himself. Testifying before a congressional subcommittee after his release, Macias said, "My case shows that the system can work. But it also shows that, when it does work, it is largely because of luck" (Radelet, Bedau and Putnam, 1992, Ibid.).
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Veritas Initiative Report, October 2010
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dortell Williams is a California prisoner who has been incarcerated for 22 years. During this time he has earned a paralegal certificate, an associate of arts degree and taught himself Spanish. He mentors at-risk youth at his facility and through correspondence. He is also the author of countless articles regarding imprisonment. A simple "Google" search of him will initiate interesting results.

Anthony "Tony" Majoy is a 75-year-old who has spent the last 24 years incarcerated for a crime he maintains he did not commit. He works to educate the public about wrongful convictions as his appeals take their slow-winding course.

Both prisoners are confined at the California state prison in Los Angeles County, where they met and began collaborating against draconian sentences such as life without the possibility of parole, or what they call the death penalty on the installment plan; a sentence they both share.